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Abstract
Everyone wants clean air, peace and other public goods but is
tempted to freeride on others’ efforts. The usual way out of this
dilemma is to impose norms, maintain reputations and incentivize indi-
viduals to contribute. In situations of high uncertainty, however, such
as confrontations of protesters with a dictatorial regime, the usual mea-
sures are not feasible, but cooperation can be achieved nevertheless.
We use an Ising model with asymmetric spins that represent coop-
eration and defection to show numerically how public goods can be
realized. Under uncertainty, people use the heuristic of conformity.
The turmoil of a confrontation causes some individuals to cooperate
accidentally, and at a critical level of turmoil, they entail a cascade of
cooperation. This critical level is much lower in small networks.
1 Introduction
A main benefit for people living in groups, ranging from families to empires,
is that collectively, they can achieve more than the sum of individuals can
independently, in particular collective goods [10]. Cases in point are in-
frastructure, health care, defense and education for a country’s population.
People first have to agree on the public good and the way to realize it, but
even if they arrive at a consensus, the provision of these goods is non-obvious
because individuals are tempted to freeride on others’ efforts. Cooperation
is a dilemma [18] that usually requires time to solve, during which people
develop norms and form a network to transmit information (gossip) about
one another, on the basis of which reputations are established that in their
turn are used to reward cooperators and punish defectors [8, 17].
This scenario is well-covered by the literature, but there are important
cases where there is no time to develop it. Examples are disasters where
victims need urgent help, protests against dictatorial regimes that prevent
critics to organize themselves, and unplanned violent confrontations between
groups. These cases have high uncertainty in common. People then realize
that cooperation might yield a valuable outcome but they can’t assess their
payoffs, among others because they don’t know if they will get hurt. Our
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questions are how cooperation under uncertainty is self-organized, and how
this is influenced by participants’ network.
The first question has been addressed by critical mass theory [11, 14],
which does not rely on norms, reputations and selective incentives (i.e. re-
wards and punishments). It argues that if a critical number of actors starts
cooperating, the others are won over to join in, thereby making cooperation
self-reinforcing. Individuals are assumed to know at each moment how many
cooperators there are in total, and to have fairly accurate expectations of
their marginal payoff. On the basis thereof they can rationally decide to
contribute to the public good or to freeload. In highly uncertain situations,
however, these rationality assumptions are unlikely to hold true. Moreover,
the theory does not show the effect of network topology, and does not explain
the cooperation of the initiative takers before the critical point is reached.
We, in contrast, explicate the effect of topology, explain the initiative takers
endogenously, and instead of rationality assume one simple heuristic: under
high uncertainty, people become conformists to the majority of their net-
work neighbors [20]. This may turn out bad for them in a specific situation
but may serve them on average over many occasions [2]. Conformism can
be observed as behavioral synchronization [15]. When people conform to
their initially defecting network neighbors, they might eventually cooperate
when many others do, but who would start?
Pending (or starting) violence and disaster are characterized by increas-
ing turmoil, for example in terms of opponents’ threats, insults and violence.
Turmoil can be measured by participant’s heart rates that indicate their
arousal [13] or, in an information theoretic manner, by accelerating situa-
tional updates to the same effect [12]. Arousal causes “trembling hands” [6]
as game theorists say, denoting a chance that some individuals accidentally
cooperate, which in turn might entail a cascade of cooperation. An example
of turmoil is the mutual provocation of soccer fans of opposing camps to
a boiling point when fighting breaks out; their public good is the humili-
ation of their opponents. To show that turmoil can drive cooperation, we
use an Ising model [1, 4], for which we make the behavioral options (spins)
asymmetric, reflecting the asymmetry of defection versus cooperation. This
provides a parsimonious explanation of cooperation without the usual mech-
anisms developed over longer time, and without rationality assumptions.
2 Model
At the beginning there is a group of n individuals who may not know one an-
other yet, in an uncertain situation. Each of them has at least visual contact
with some others, and identifies with, and is therefore inclined to conform
to, others who share an interest in a given public good. The network of
visual or verbal ties Aij denoting that i pays attention to j is represented by
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Figure 1: Ising model with S = {1,−1/2}. Mean dissatisfaction H/n at
different levels of cooperation M in a network with n = 2, and in a random
net with n = 20 and density = 0.8. In the latter, vertical line segments are
composed of dots, each representing a micro state. The dash-dotted line is
drawn with the mean field approach (MF).
a row-normalized adjacency matrix with cells aij = Aij/
∑
j Aij , as in many
models of social influence [9], hence
∑
j aij = 1. Ties are bi-directional but
asymmetric, and the network may have multiple disconnected components.
An individual can cooperate (C) or defect (D) with C > D > 0, and ev-
erybody defects at the beginning. The behavioral variable Si can take the
value Si = C or Si = −D. Behavior and network are expressed in the
Hamiltonian of the Ising model
H = −
n∑
i 6=j
aijSiSj . (1)
The mean degree of cooperation is described by an order parameter
M = 1/n
∑n
i=1 Si. A cooperator’s payoff is a share of the public good
at a cost PC = r(M + C/n) − C, with a synergy parameter r > 1; a
defector’s payoff is PD = r(M − D/n) [19]. In conventional game theory,
C = 1 and D = 0 [19], but since payoffs are used only comparatively, it
does not matter if they are negative here. If people believe that C ≤ D,
this payoff function does not apply and people will not cooperate anyway.
If they believe that C > D, they may cooperate provided that enough
others do. Because under high uncertainty, participants can’t assess the
synergy of their collective effort, don’t know the costs and benefits, and in
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large groups can’t see all cooperators, they can’t calculate their payoff. The
conformism heuristic then works as a collective lever that minimizes H and
can maximize the mean payoff indirectly, even without individuals knowing
the payoff function. Individuals’ heuristic decision making is implemented
computationally by the Metropolis algorithm [1]. Over a large number of
Monte Carlo steps, a node i is chosen randomly, its behavior Si is flipped
from D to C (or the other way around), and H is compared to H ′ that has
the flip implemented and is otherwise identical to H. The flip is accepted if
for a random number 0 ≤ cr ≤ 1,
cr < exp
(−(H ′ −H)
T
)
, (2)
where T is the level of turmoil, or temperature in the original model [1].
H/n can be regarded as mean dissatisfaction with respect to the conformity
heuristic, biased towards cooperation for the public good. The relation be-
tween H/n and M is illustrated in Fig. 1 for S = {1,−1/2} on a network
with n = 2, for a random net with n = 20 including all micro states (con-
figurations of C’s and D’s) therein, and in a mean field approach (MF) for
comparison. The Metropolis minimization of H starts at the defective state
(at the left) and evolves by random steps over all micro states until the
lowest value of H is reached at the cooperative state (at the right).
3 Results
The relation between cooperation, M , and turmoil, T , turns out to be qual-
itatively the same for all networks. At low turmoil, there is no cooperation
but it emerges at a critical level Tc, illustrated in Fig. 2. Then the turmoil
overcomes the “energy” barrier (the mountain in Fig. 1), and drives the
transition to the cooperative state. For as long as T < Tc, the chance that
this happens in a finite number of Monte Carlo steps is zero. If T keeps
increasing beyond Tc, the effect of turmoil becomes progressively more dom-
inant until individuals randomly alternate cooperation and defection. Here,
turmoil trumps conformism. If not by this chaos, cooperation will end when
the public good is realized, others intervene, the participants get exhausted,
or if they get to understand the situation (i.e. their uncertainty lowers) and
start behaving strategically (i.e. freeride).
Social networks, if large, are clustered and sparse with a skewed degree
distribution [16]. We therefore examine the effects of clustering, density,
degree distribution and size on the tipping point Tc, and subsequently zoom
in on local variations of S. As a characteristic example of clustering, we
start with ten cliques (fully connected networks) with n = 10 each (Fig. 2).
When randomly rewiring ties with a probability p, the network becomes
more random at higher p and thereby less clustered, as in small world net-
works [16]. Decreasing clustering results in increasing Tc. In Fig. 3 this is
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Figure 2: Ising model with S = {1,−1/2}, showing M with increasing T
for a network with n = 100 and 10 clusters, n = 10 each. There is a chance
p for ties to be rewired. If p = 0, the clusters are fully connected cliques,
mutually disconnected. The network at p = 0.01 is shown at the inset and
with a dotted line in the M−T plot. If p = 1 the network becomes essentially
a random graph, with a higher Tc.
demonstrated by starting with a strongly clustered network, and by rewiring
the links, which will often form random cross-cluster connections. From the
most strongly clustered network onward, the largest effect on Tc is at small
numbers of rewired ties. The effect of network size on the tipping point is
larger than of clustering, though, in particular at the smallest network sizes
(Fig. 4). Tc is also lower in sparser networks but the effect of density is much
weaker than of size and more variable across simulation runs (not shown).
When varying the degree distribution between Poisson and power law, Tc
does not change at all. In sum, changes of Tc are largest at small network
size, high clustering, and low density.
To investigate the effect of local variations of S, we generalize the values
of S = {1,−1/2} that we used in the above examples. To this end we rewrite
the asymmetric Ising model in a symmetric form by the mapping
S = {C,−D} → {S0 + ∆, S0 −∆}, (3)
with a bias S0 = (C−D)/2 and an increment ∆ = (C+D)/2. Accordingly,
the values chosen in our examples imply S0 = 0.25 and ∆ = 0.75. Elsewhere
we show that the Hamiltonian, once written in a symmetric form, becomes
a conventional Ising model plus a global external field and a locally varying
field that depends on the network [3]. We use this generalized form in a
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Figure 3: Effect of increasing rewiring on the tipping point Tc in a n = 100
graph with 10 clusters, n = 10 each, as in Fig. 2. Again, S = {1,−1/2}.
The horizontal axis indicates the number of swaps. A swap is generated by
randomly choosing three nodes with 1 and 2 connected but not 1 and 3.
Then 1’s tie to 2 is relayed to 3. The simulation was repeated five times
(plus signs) and resulted in an average value indicated by the dots connected
by the dash-dotted line.
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Figure 4: Effect of increasing network size n on the tipping point Tc in
random networks with density = 0.8 and S = {1,−1/2}. The dots show
small variation across simulation runs.
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mean field analysis, from which we infer that for given ∆, higher S0 (that
corresponds to a stronger interest in the public good) results in lower Tc [3].
We now use different S0 in a network with two clusters, keeping ∆ = 0.75.
When p = 0 the two groups are disconnected, but within-group links can be
randomly rewired with a probability p and thereby connect the two groups.
In Fig. 5, two two-cluster networks (n = 20) with p = 0 and p = 0.1,
respectively, are illustrated at the top and bottom row; T = 0.09 for both.
In each network, all members of one cluster (top) have S0 = 0.50 and all
members of the other cluster (bottom) have S0 = 0.25. For the network with
disconnected groups, the group with lower S0 does not reach its tipping
point. When the groups are connected (p = 0.1), the group with higher
S0 helps the other group to cooperate at lower Tc than it would on its
own, whereas the former is somewhat held back by the latter. This result
generalizes to small numbers of initiative takers or leaders with higher S0
embedded in a network of many others with lower S0, where the initiative
takers reduce Tc for the majority (not shown).
4 Conclusions
The model points out that under high uncertainty, the dilemma of cooper-
ation can in principle be solved by situational turmoil among conformists.
This solution holds for a broad range of networks, although the critical level
of turmoil is markedly lower in small ones, which implies that turmoil-driven
cooperation is more likely in small than in large groups. This result is con-
sistent with empirical findings on violent group confrontations, where most
of the physical violence is committed by small subgroups [5]. Small fighting
groups increase overall turmoil, though, which may agitate larger groups
to join. The model also shows that there is no need for especially zealous
initiative takers (with high S0) to get cooperation started, even though they
help to get it started at lower turmoil.
Our contributions are threefold. First, we made an asymmetric Ising
model, which has a different phase transition than the widely used symmet-
ric model. Second, we provided computational evidence that the dilemma
of cooperation can be solved without complicated and costly mechanisms
such as reputations, selective incentives and rationality. Third, we showed
which networks are most conductive to cooperation under high uncertainty.
Future studies could confront the model with empirical data, perhaps even
of different species, for example buffalo herd bulls who chase a lion together
[7]. One could also investigate more systematically the numbers of necessary
Monte Carlo steps for different networks and distributions of S0.
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Figure 5: Networks with two groups at T = 0.09. Top row left: adjacency
matrix of two disconnected groups (p = 0, n = 10), with S0 = 0.50 (nodes 1–
10) and S0 = 0.25 (nodes 11–20), respectively. The top row right panel has
Monte Carlo steps on the horizontal axis. The group with higher S0 (nodes
1–10) cooperates after few Monte Carlo steps whereas the group with lower
S0 (11–20) does not cooperate. Bottom row left: for the same two groups,
ties are randomly rewired with a chance p = 0.1, resulting in connections
between the groups that are visible in the adjacency matrix. Bottom row
right: the group with higher S0 (1–10) wins over the other group (11–20) to
cooperate after few Monte Carlo steps. The different gray tones for the two
cooperating subgroups are due to their different S0 values.
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